Security authentication has typically been based on three factors — something you know (password, PIN), something you have (physical key, security token, access card), something you are (fingerprint, voice, iris pattern) — but a fourth factor is becoming more prevalent: somewhere you are.
A growing number of commercial and government applications depend on GPS to validate the location of a user attempting to access a sensitive system, resource, or physical space, but the challenge is that GPS can be easily hijacked. The powerful and cryptographically secure Satellite Time and Location (STL) signal from Satelles is impervious to cyberattacks, making it more reliable than GPS for location-based authentication.
GNSS issues caused by signal interference or satellite anomalies are a risk to seafaring vessels using GNSS for navigation, potentially causing them to delay their departures or cut short their journeys. However, cyberattacks aiming to mislead GNSS represent a far more significant threat. Counterfeit signals can be difficult to detect because the signal appears to be genuine. When an illicit signal broadcast by a malign actor with nefarious intent hijacks a legitimate GNSS signal and transmits fake positioning information, ships at sea veer off course without even knowing it — potentially into dangerous waters.
Available worldwide today via low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites, Satellite Time and Location (STL) from Satelles provides an alternative navigation to GNSS, delivering a solution for mariners’ peace of mind. As a reliable location source, Satelles can support applications that provide an early warning and direct mitigation for potentially inauthentic signals if the reported locations from STL and GPS/GNSS are no longer in agreement. With an cryptographically secure signal that is over 1,000 times more powerful than GNSS and impervious to being blocked or faked, STL delivers a strong and secure signal to every corner of the globe to keep vessels safe.